
The First Burmese War and the Madras Army – A narrative

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(By Prof. C. S. Srinivasachari, M. A.)

I.-Introductory.

The Burmese Government did not know much of international affairs except through bazaar rumour and through the tales, usually anti-English propaganda, of Armenian and Mohammedan merchants who hated the East India Company's trade monopoly. The French Admiral Suffrein had indeed told his government that Burma was the country through which the English might be attacked with most advantage; but Burma never succeeded in getting into real communication with France, though she sent embassies to Indian kings with a view to making a combined attack on the English. The Burmese King talked in 1813 of making a pilgrimage to Buddhagaya and Benares, attended by 40,000 men; and in the period 1807 to 1823 he sent several missions consisting of nobles and Brahmans who went as far as Delhi and collected Buddhist sacred books and relics. The English missions which visited Burma from 1795 onwards when Captain Symes went over to Rangoon, were more political embassies than commercial missions but undertaken on a large scale with lavish expenditure. His successor, the Rangoon political agent, Captain Cox, first made Government realise the futility of any embassy to the Burmese Court whose strength and sanity had been greatly exaggerated by Rymes. The later missions of Captain Canning, in all three visits of his to Burma in 1803, 1809 and 1811, could not make King Bodawpaya (1782-1819) realise the dignity and power of the Governor-General at Calcutta, treaty with whom he considered to be below his dignity. The King claimed Bengal far west beyond Calcutta, because he was successor to the Rajahs of Arakan who had at various times ruled over Chittagong and had even raided Murshidabad and Calcutta. "The Burmese lived in a land which was geographically isolated. Nobody from other lands came to them, except a few ship-men and some tribal immigrants; nor did they themselves visit other lands, for their population was so small that it could not fill even their own country. They lived in a world of their own."¹

Bodawpaya died in 1819 and was succeeded by his grandson Bagyidaw. (1819-37) who, though possessed of some nice qualities, was fickle and irritable and

¹ Page 290 of G. E. Harvey-*History of Burma*, with a preface by Sir R. C. Temple (1925). This book gives specimens of the correspondence which passed between Burma and the Government of India for a generation-among them being one from the Governor-General, dated 22nd June 1818, to the Viceroy of Pegu, included in H. H. Wilson's "Documents illustrative of the Burmese War" (Calcutta 1827). The Burmese pursued an equally vigorous policy in Assam which was occupied by an army under Maha Thilawa who made demonstrations on the English frontier (1821).

moreover guided by men of low origin. He commenced his reign well enough, shifted his capital to Ava, sent a mission to Buddhagaya, and probably waited for an opportunity to make an alliance with any of the hostile Native Princes of India, which however did not come. But prompt measures were taken to enforce Burmese supremacy in Manipur which led to British operations to take Kachar under their own protection and to support its rightful Raja Govindachandra.

As early as 1794 some robbers from Arakan took refuge in Chittagong. The Burmese marched a body of 5, 000 men into British territory and refused to withdraw until the delinquents were given up. The robbers were surrendered and this was followed by Colonel Symes' mission to Ava, which resulted only in a report in which the envoy over-estimated "the population of Burma by 400 per cent. and the sanity of the court by considerably more", seeing everything superficially and *couleur de rose* and thus misleading the Government. Cox's account was so very different from that of Symes that Government thought he had perhaps made some mistake; and they wrote to the Burmese King saying that they regretted that the envoy did not give satisfaction. The second mission of Symes in 1802 was not followed by a book. The later missions of Captain Canning were equally futile; he was exposed to much insult and danger, being threatened with arrest to be held as a hostage for the delivery of some Arakanese rebels who sallied out occasionally from Chittagong to raid Burmese territory. The surrender of the Arakanese rebels was again and again demanded by the Burmese, culminating in the 2nd letter of the Raja of Ramree demanding the cession of Ramoo, Chittagong, Dacca, and Murshidabad to which the Governor-General replied by the letter noted above and which was never disowned by the Burmese King. The entry of a Burmese force in two columns, one from Assam and the other from Manipur-into Kachar and its collision with the British were almost simultaneous with the ambitious march of Maha Bandula towards Chittagong over the dispute as to Shapuri Island which lay on the British side of the main channel of the Naf River, the acknowledged boundary of the two states (Jan. 1824). The British Government explained its motives to the Government of Ava in a communication on the 24th February and in a public proclamation declaring war on the 5th March; but these were only answered by an arrogant letter from the Burman Governor of Pegu expounding the views of his king. The pacific and conciliatory attitude adopted by the English Government so long had only tended to increase the insolence and rapacity of the Burmese whose war appetite had been whetted by their recent victorious campaigns in Assam in which the famous Maha Bandula² had distinguished himself and who

² " He was pre-eminent in stratagems of a type which was devastating against enemies of his own class; and in the management of Burmese levies no light task he evinced real talent. He was just, self-sacrificing, honest to an unusual degree and unlike the court he was willing to learn by experience..... He was an imperialist of the most aggressive type; yet it is unjust to regard him as

were now free from Siamese enmity which had engrossed much of their attention till 1822. The war was popular with the whole community, not only with the soldiers and the nobility, but also with the common masses. "It was not the King who led the people, but the people who led the King into war. For long he had been a moderating influence, hesitating to accept the advice of his commanders who thirsted for fresh victories."³

II.-Operations during 1824.

The first operations of the English took place in Sylhet and Assam. The Burmese gained a victory at Doodpatli forcing the English troops to retire with a severe loss. But Colonel Morine penetrated by the end of March into Assam as far as Gauhati and took quiet possession of the province. In the Chittagong district however the Burmese worsted and slew Captain Noton, commanding in that quarter. This last produced a temporary panic in Calcutta; but the enemy did not advance nearer than Ramoo (to the south of Chittagong).⁴

The Calcutta Government planned a considerable expedition by sea which should attack the maritime territories of the Burmese at a vulnerable point and thus effect an entire change in the operations. The forces of the expedition were made up of 2,175 fighting men from the Bengal Army with 20 gunbrigs and schooners, and two divisions from the Madras Army of nearly 9,000 men⁵ under the command of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell who had distinguished himself in Spain, with Brigadier-General Macbean in charge of the Madras force, and Major Canning as the Political Agent and Joint Commissioner with the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, who had been corresponding with Lord Amherst on the question of the Madras contribution to the expedition and on the general issues of the war and the objectives of the expedition, was very solicitous about placing the expedition in such a condition as should enable it to move in every direction with a moral certainty of success. He however thought very lightly of the military prowess of the Burmese and regarded their petty initial successes as but mere accidents-thinking that the alarm which prevailed even in Calcutta was not at all explicable.⁶

responsible for the war of 1824; he did indeed force it on; but in advocating it he was merely the mouthpiece of the entire people." (Harvey-History of Burma-p 301.) Like his great hero Alaungpaya, Maha Bandula's fame was got by victories, and he obtained his results by "using methods known to every energetic Burmese commander ". He was born about 1780 in the Monywa district and came into prominence under King Bodawpaya.

³ J. Crawford-Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava (1834-2 Volumes), Vol. II, appendix; tJp. 71, 119, and 123 quoted by Harvey.

⁴ W. F. B. Laurie-Our Burmese Wars and Relations with Burma (2nd Ed.), 1885,

⁵ The component elements and equipments of the army are given in detail in E. Thornton-The History of the British Empire in India (1843), Vol. V, pp. 19-20.

⁶ Letters that passed between Munro and Amherst from February 1824, quoted in pp. 95-143 of Vol. II of the Rev. R. Ghleig's The Life of Sir Thomas Munro (1830).

In all his letters he was against the conclusion of any armistice till after the enemy should have been thoroughly humbled.

It was Munro alone that reposed absolute confidence in the loyalty of the Indian people at that time. "While apprehensions prevailed elsewhere of commotions and conspiracies, and a cry was raised for more troops to supply the place of those employed at Rangoon, Sir Thomas Munro uniformly maintained that "there existed no ground of alarm; and even the Mutiny at Barrackpore failed to convince him that the force already embodied was not fully adequate to preserve the tranquility of the country."⁷

The place at which the English expeditionary forces met was the port of Cornwallis in the Andaman Islands where the troops arrived on 3rd May 1824. From here Sir Archibald Campbell sailed direct for Rangoon, sending one detachment against the Island of Cheduba and another against the Island of Negrais. The fleet arrived at the mouth of the Rangoon River on the 9th and stood up the river opposite the battery of the King's Wharf on the 11th. A sharp cannonade drove the Burmese authorities out of the town, and the houses of the city were taken possession of by the landing force along with a large but indifferent quantity of ordnance. The Islands of Cheduba and Negrais were captured at almost the same time.

The setting in of the rainy season and some disagreements that unfortunately took place between the naval and land forces as well as the difficulty of procuring boats and skilful pilots to carry the armament up the rivers made the position of Sir Archibald uncomfortable in the extreme while it would have been dangerous to have ventured from up the Irrawaddi unless the co-operation of the land force could be secured which could be done only by cleaving the way through some hard fighting. Thus for six months, from May to November, British operations were confined to Rangoon and its vicinity; their ultimate success depended upon their compelling the enemy to retreat into the interior and then following them which would hang "not so much on the decisive advantage gained in anyone action, as on the continued judgment and skill which regulated

⁷ Ibid; pp. 145 and 152. He wrote to Mr. Sullivan, dated 11th July 1825-- "We have sent on foreign service beyond the sea from Madras, five regiments of European infantry, two companies of European artillery, a battalion of pioneers and above one thousand dooly-bearers and, we have relieved the Bengal subsidiary force at Nagpur". Again, writing to Mr. Wynn, dated 5th January 1826, Munro said - " I have left India as naked of troops as it can safely be; and if I have committed any error it is rather in having sent away too many than too few. But I have not acted without fully considering the state of the country, and all the chances of disturbance; and as I find that we must either weaken ourselves a little more than is prudent; or expose the army in Ava to failure from the want of reinforcements, I have not hesitated to support Sir Archibald Campbell to the utmost of extent of our power".

the whole system of our military tactics”⁸ .

In the attack on Kemmendine four miles from Rangoon, by the Grenadiers Company of H. M.'s 38th Regiment and the men of H. M. S. Liffey, the enemy's stockade was stormed with great intrepidity and carried with some loss. The Burmese, shut in their stockaded encampment and thrown into confusion by the impetuosity of the British fire, had to fight until they were cut to pieces. Some days of quiet followed the operations of Kemmendine; the enemy abandoned every stockade in the immediate vicinity of the town; their new general began a fresh policy of desultory warfare and formed a cordon round the British position. Sir Archibald tried his best to break this cordon; and in one encounter as many as ten stockades were captured in the course of one day and the enemy general killed. But the Court of Ava would not be affected so long as the English operations were confined to the vicinity of Rangoon (which was only a town of Pegu, one of the conquered provinces of the Burman Empire); and no thoughts of peace would be entertained by it. Hence Sir Archibald, still unable to proceed up the river, had recourse to the plan of capturing some of the Burman ports on the eastern shore and fitted out an expedition under Lieutenant-Colonel Miles which in the course of a few months captured Tavoy, Tenasserim and Mergui which brought in the whole of the Tenasserim sea-board under the British control. It was now that the forces suffered terrible sickness.⁹ During this time operations continued at the several points of the northern frontier, on the borders of Assam and in Kachar and Manipur. All this time the Burmese engaged the main force with night attacks on pickets; the English fared badly on one occasion when Colonel Smith at the head of some Madras troops advanced against Kykloo, 14 miles from Rangoon, and had to retreat, though the post itself was soon afterwards captured. In these engagements the Madras Pioneers greatly distinguished themselves.¹⁰ In the months of October and November there was comparative peace. An expedition was directed against Martaban under Colonel Godwin which took possession of the place with little trouble and where the English got a vast quantity of ammunition. These operations on the fringes of the Burmese Empire were undertaken principally with a view to maintain English prestige and to weaken the enemy on all sides. To a certain extent they were successful, especially in Assam and Tenasserim; but in Arakan British interests were less prosperous as seen in the failure of Captain Noton at Ramoo. The main interest of the war thus centred in the expedition of General Campbell.¹¹

⁸ Laurie-Our Burmese Wars (p, 15).

⁹ Sir Arthur P. Phayre-*History Of Burma* (1883), p. 240: "The troops endured this trial, before which ordinary hardships of a campaign were nought, with admirable fortitude".

¹⁰ Major H. M. Vibart-*The Military History of the Madras Engineers and Pioneers* (1883, Vol. II; p. 81).

¹¹ Detailed attention is not paid here to these subsidiary operations as the Madras forces did not engage in Assam and Arakan.

These successes on the frontiers were marred by a defeat or two. The subsidiary operations on the fringes which were undertaken from the defensive standpoint, resulted, as noted, in the establishment of British authority; over a considerable portion of Assam; but in Arakan Captain Noton was defeated in the defence of Ramoo; and the withdrawal of British force from Sylhet to protect Chittagong which was threatened after the English defeat at Ramoo enabled the Burmese to enter again Cachar. This was followed by events of an indecisive character in which neither party gained any advantage; and the English had to suspend active operations after a time owing to the unhealthy nature of the province.

The Burmese King resolved to collect resources for a great struggle; and he recalled the armies that had been sent into Arakan and Assam. He sent a big army under Maha Bandula whose reputation had been greatly enhanced by his partial successes in Chittagong.¹² He now set out for Donabew with a large fleet of war-boats and a great quantity of military stores. His object was to drive the English from their position at Kemmendine and ultimately force them into their ships. He made his appearance before Rangoon in front of the British position on the 1st of December and threw up the usual entrenchments with extraordinary rapidity.¹³

The English position at Kemmendine was vigorously assaulted several times on the 1st day and succeeding days, but was very bravely maintained,¹⁴ "with signal gallantry and admirable effect," by the 26th Madras Native Infantry and a detachment of the Madras European regiment. The 18th Madras Infantry burst through the enemy's entrenchments on the left, even on the 1st December, "with a spirit that did them honour, carrying all opposition before them". For the first few days the enemy continued their approaches and annoyed the British posts by frequent attacks. On the 5th, Sir Archibald determined to take the offensive and ordered an advance in two columns on their position; and in this the 3rd Madras Native Infantry greatly distinguished itself. On the 7th a simultaneous attack by four columns on the enemy's right, centre, and left resulted in their rout, abandonment of their entrenchments and flight into the jungle, leaving a large quantity of ordnance.

¹² Maha Bandula was possibly dreaming of an expedition into Bengal and his retreat from Arakan certainly relieved the inhabitants of Calcutta from considerable anxiety and enabled the quick British occupation of the region which followed.

¹³ This is described very vividly by Major Snodgrass in his *Narrative of the Burmese War* (2nd Ed. 1827), pp. 101-104; as appearing to the English to be the work of magic or enchantment.

¹⁴ The letter of Sir Archibald Campbell describing the operations says: -" For six successive days they tried in vain every effort that hope of success and dread of failure could call forth, to drive the brave 26th and a handful of Europeans from this post. While tremendous fire-rafts (described by Snodgrass in his *Narrative*, p. 105) and crowds of war-boats were everyday employed in the equally vain endeavour to drive the shipping from this station off the place". (Dated the 9th December 1824 and quoted in full in Laurie's book, p. 32.)

So gallant was the behaviour of the Sepoys that Sir Archibald wrote of them: "Never did troops strive to obtain the palm of honour better than they, to rival their European comrades in everything that marks the steady true and daring soldier." Maha Bandula quickly recovered from his defeat, rallied his scattered forces, returned to a formerly occupied position at Kokeen which he admirably fortified and entrenched " with a judgment in point of position such as would do credit to the best instructed engineers of the most civilised and warlike nations." The English took that position by a furious assault in which the Madras regiments again greatly distinguished themselves. On the same day (15th December) a part of the naval force captured a number of the enemy's war-boats. After this Maha Bandula retired with his shattered army to Donabew; and the English for the first time found themselves, in an undisturbed possession of their base of advance.

III-The Course of the War in 1825-26.

The English General determined on an advance upon Prome, the second city in the Burman Empire; and in order that he might have no obstruction in his rear, he sent an expedition against Siriam, and old Portuguese fort, and took it with great ease. He also routed an advance division of the enemy forces stationed at Thantabain on the Lain river equally easily. The English advance was to be in two columns, one to move by land under the immediate command of Sir Archibald Campbell and the other under General Cotton to proceed by water. Still another force was detached under Major (later General) Sale to occupy Bassein. The water column came to Donabew where Maha Bandula was strongly stockaded with 15,000 men, but failed in carrying off the second defence of the enemy, apparently from "some deficiency of steadiness in the attacking party." Sir Archibald had to hurry up with his column to Donabew after crossing the Irrawaddi with great difficulty (25th March 1825). For several days there were skirmishes of a desultory kind before the stockades until the death of Maha Bandula¹⁵ from a rocket led to a panic and evacuation of the place by the Burman troops on the 2nd April. This was the greatest misfortune which befell the Burmese and was the real turning point of the war. The English Army continued its advance to Prome by rapid stages, after having been reinforced by a column of reserve troops from Rangoon and a number of elephants. There was no interruption of this march except for the arrival of two messengers from the King intimating the willingness of the Court of Ava to conclude a peace which was likely enough a ruse for the sake of gaining time. Prome¹⁶ was easily occu-

¹⁵ His military capacity is estimated highly by Major Snodgrass (Narrative, pp. 175-77) and he is likened to the Swedish Charles XII and compared with the clever African Chief Betewayo by Colonel Laurie (pp. 44 and 48).

¹⁶ But for the cowardice of the enemy. Prome must have presented an almost impossible barrier to the progress of the British army. By nature and art it was rendered so favourable that in the judgment of Sir Archibald Campbell ten thousand steady soldiers might have defended it against ten times that force" (Thornton; History of the British Empire in India, Vol. V, p. 57).

pied on the 25th April without the enemy firing a single shot and leaving in the fort a large quantity of artillery and huge supplies of grain.

The English stayed for several months at Prome in consequence of the letting-in of the monsoon and the heavy inundation of the country. Measures were taken to restore the confidence of the people who slowly returned to the city. A small corps of observation was sent out for the purpose of clearing the interior of the Prome region of the military bands which infested it and oppressed the inhabitants. It marched against Tonghoo, a walled city to the north-east; and finding a mountainous country beyond which were forests, it moved on to Meady, sixty miles above Prome on the Irrawaddi finally returning back to headquarters.

The Burmese King made great exertions to collect a new force; and an army of 20,000 men advanced to Paghaw Mew, Melloon and finally to Meady, before an armistice was proposed and accepted;¹⁷ but the Burmese were not prepared to cede any territory or give any pecuniary compensation while the English General regarded the discussions as being only tedious and frivolous. After the armistice ended on November 2nd, the Burmese pushed their army to the very gates of Prome, with a resolve not to risk a general engagement, but to proceed by the slower, but more certain, method of blockade. It was resolved to attack them at once. Their lines extended for several miles from the river to the east. Their left was stockaded in jungles; their centre was entrenched on the inaccessible hills of Napadee, and on the river side they had several heavy batteries on a commanding ridge of hills. On the 1st of December the British attacked the enemy's left and carried off by assault their position at Simbike; on the next day Sir James Brisbane at the head of the fleet, cannonaded the heights of the enemy's right from the river; and the heights of Napadee were carried off in that and the next four days-probably the most arduous duty the army had yet undertaken. By the 5th of December the English victory was complete, and every division of the Burmese army had been beaten and dispersed in all directions.

General Campbell now determined to move on to Ava sending one division circuitously to attack the enemy's fortified positions along the river, while another division proceeded along the river and with the flotilla. By the end of the month

¹⁷Sir Archibald Campbell declared that the Court of Ava should abstain from any interference in Kachar, Manipur, and Assam, give the last region over to the British and pay 2 crores of rupees as an indemnity, the province of Tenasserim being retained till its payment. The Burmese commissioners modestly requested that the British would quit the country "without making any stipulations for their own benefit and leave their claims to the generosity of their King". The conference which took place at Neoun-ben-zeik was arranged with most scrupulous regard to the presentation of the formal dignity of the Burmese commissioners and of their king. (See Snodgrass' Narrative, pp. 215-7.)

the army reached the river opposite Melloon about half way between Ava and Prome. The Burmese King had at last to realise the gravity of the situation. He treated with full powers. The negotiations which took place on the 1st and 2nd January 1826 ended in the Burmese agreeing to cede Arakan and the provinces of Yeh, Tavoi, and Mergui and to pay one crore of rupees. The ratification of the treaty was not received by the agreed date. The British commissioners insisted on immediate hostilities, except on condition of the Burmese evacuating Melloon within 36 hours and retiring upon Ava. Hostilities recommenced on the 19th and in a few hours the troops landed and erected the British standard on the walls of Melloon.

The English army advanced towards Ava, but was met in a few days by Dr. Price, an American missionary, and Mr. Sandford, an English army surgeon, both of whom had been taken prisoners a few months before and were now sent on their *parole* by the Burmese King to ascertain the lowest terms upon which peace could be made. The English General renewed the terms offered at Melloon and promised not to advance further than Pagahm Mew for 12 days. The Burmese King resolved to make one last effort, pathetically appealed to his subjects, representing himself and the immortal dominion of Ava as tottering to their fall and collected about 20,000 men to whom he gave the name of "Retrievers of the King's Glory." They took up their position at Pagahm Mew and were easily dispersed by an English attack on the 9th of February. In this victory Generals Campbell and Cotton simultaneously attacked the enemy's right and left, while the 43rd Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Parlbey advanced on the bank of the river to prevent the enemy throwing troops in the rear.¹⁸

The English general proceeded with his advance to the capital when he was met by Messrs. Price and Sandford carrying the assent of the King to the proposed terms. But suspecting a ruse for procrastination as usual in this, the advance of the army was not stopped by General Campbell till he reached Yandabo: four days march from Ava, when he was met by the Burmese commissioners accompanying the two mediators. The main provisions of this important Treaty (of Yandabo) need not be enumerated here except that the Burmese agreed to abstain from interfering in Assam, Kachar and Jaintia, to cede the four provinces of Arakan, as well Yeh, Tavoy, Mergui and Tenasserim, to receive a British resident in Ava and depute a Burman resident to Calcutta and to concur in a commercial treaty.

¹⁸ The official report of this engagement as given by General Campbell is a little different from the Narrative of his Military Secretary, Major Snodgrass (Thornton, Vol. iv, p. 79).

IV.-Conclusion.

Thus the first Burmese War¹⁹ ended which gave a better scientific frontier to British India to the eastward In the prosecution of the operations the army, and in particular the Madras Companies, played their part heroically well; and in Parliament, on the 8th May 1827, Mr. C.W. Wynn moved in the House of Commons, followed some days later by Lord Goderich in the Upper House; "that the thanks of each House be given to .the officers and men engaged in the late glorious successes in India." The Government of India published an order, dated 15th May 1827, No. 94, to mark their high sense of the indefatigable exertions on .the Madras Pioneers throughout the war and particularly of Jamadar Andoo to whom were awarded special honours and a pension. Both the Pioneers and the Engineers were highly commended in the general orders.

The Burmese War has been severely criticised both in the manner of its commencement and in the details of its operations. But, as in the case of Nepal, war must have come about sooner or later with the aggressive and self-opinionated Burmese Government; with regard to the conduct of the operations, however much the expedition to Rangoon and the march to Ava were desirable, the army ought not to have been despatched in almost entire ignorance of the circumstances of the country and without any adequate preparations for securing supplies. The want of better information and more complete arrangements contributed to much of the hardships suffered by the troops. But this could have been got over as the war was not a sudden and unexpected occurrence and as previous missions had been despatched to that country which eould have been asked to furnish materials. The American Missionary, Mr. Judson, who came to Burma in 1813, gives a very good account of the surprise created in the Burmese mind by the British troops and their bravery and successes.²⁰

¹⁹ The Royal Chronicle of the Burmese thus naively describes the war in the years 1186 and 1187 (of the Burmese era) the kula pyu (white men) fastened a quarrel upon the Lord of the Golden Palace. They landed at Rangoon, took that place and Prome and were permitted to advance as far as Yandabo; for the King from motives of piety and regard to life, made no preparations whatever to oppose them. The strangers had spent large sums of money in their enterprise, so that by the time they reached Yandobo, their resources were exhausted and they were in great distress. They then petitioned the King, who in his clemency and generosity sent them large sums of money to pay their expenses back and ordered them out of the country." as quoted by Laurie, p. 60.

²⁰ Thornton; Vol. V, Note on pp. 92-96. The documented narrative of H. H. Wilson and the account of Major Snodgrass who confines his account to the operations of the army under General Campbell are particularly valuable sources. Sir Arthur Phayre pays a high tribute to the Burmese soldier who was more than a match for Asiatic troops led by Europeans and only succumbed to the European soldier. (History of Burma, p. 250.)

He also tells us of the difficulty the Burmese found in understanding the forbearance and moderation of the victors. In England the Burmese war was not at all popular, nor were its course and fruits looked on with satisfaction. The impression of the effect of the war on some parts of British India has been noted already.
